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Katzenbach v. McClung: The Abandonment of 
Federalism in the Name of Rational Basis 
James M. McGoldrick* 
"[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testi-
mony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regula-
tory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investiga-
tion is at an end. " 1 
"Congress had a rational basis for believing that carjacking substan-
tially affects interstate commerce. "2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The point of this Article is a simple one: The prevailing rational ba-
sis test is the wrong test for determining the constitutional scope of fed-
eral commerce power and is inconsistent with the bedrock principle of 
our federalist form of government that the central government is limited 
to enumerated powers. 3 The 1964 case of Katzenbach v. McClung, 4 is 
the germinal beginning of this misuse of the rational basis test in re-
solving fundamental issues of federalism. 5 The Court in McClung found 
* Copyright rtJ 1999 by James M. McGoldrick, Professor of Law, Pepperdine Uni-
versity School of Law. 
1. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964). 
2. United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 576 (3d Cir. 1995). 
3. The value of this constitutional principle is accepted for now but will be more fully ex-
plored. See infra Part VI. 
4. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
5. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 using both its power under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and its power to regulate interstate commerce. Pursuant to Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it banned racial discrimination supported by state action, and using its 
commerce power it banned racial discrimination as to private action impacting interstate com-
merce. In an early turn of the century case, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court 
held that Congress' Section 5 power was limited to preventing state actions in violation of the sub-
stantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. While this may have been an incorrect limita-
tion on Section 5 power, the Civil Rights Cases have never been reversed. In a concurring opinion 
to both Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and McClung, Justice 
Douglas argued that the Court should have upheld the whole of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as 
within Section 5 power, both as to state acts and private acts. He felt that commerce power was an 
illogical and irrelevant power for addressing the harm of private racial discrimination. See Heart 
of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 293. I believe that Justice Douglas was correct in his argument, that 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was within Congress' Section 5 power, and that the Court should 
1 
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that Congress had the commerce power to regulate racial discrimination 
at the consummately local Ollie's Barbecue. The 1995 case of United 
States v. Lopez,6 holding that a congressional ban on guns on public 
school property was outside the scope of Congress' commerce power, 
unfortunately is not a significant retreat from the improper use of the 
rational basis test. 7 After summarizing the historical cases, including 
McClung, Chief Justice Rehnquist for the majority in Lopez concludes, 
"[s]ince that time, the Court has ... undertaken to decide whether a 
rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity suffi-
ciently affected interstate commerce. "8 It then obfuscated the matter by 
seeming to apply the fundamentally different "substantially affects" 
test. 9 The four-person dissent in Lopez relies even more heavily on the 
have reversed the Civil Rights Cases. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was important legislation ad-
dressing the national problem of private racism which was not being handled adequately at the 
state and local level, exactly the kind of legislation which Congress should be passing. Nonethe-
less, the Court did not uphold the law on Section 5 grounds and instead upheld the Civil Rights 
Act on the basis of the commerce power, an unnecessary, incorrect, and, in terms of the virtues of 
a federalist system, a dangerous holding. Upholding even such a beneficial federal law with a cor-
rupt interpretation of the commerce clause works harm into the distant future. 
6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
7. Indeed the lower courts constantly cite Lopez for the proposition that the rational basis 
test is the correct test. With few exceptions, the rational basis test in the circuit courts even post-
Lopez is endemic without regard to subject matter, statutory reference to interstate commerce, or 
reality of impact on interstate commerce. Typical is United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 30 (3d 
Cir. 1997), finding the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), a law with an interstate component, 
within federal power: "Our job ... is not to second-guess the legislative judgment of Congress 
that [the regulated activity] substantially affects interstate commerce, but rather to ensure that 
Congress had a rational basis for that conclusion." (citation omitted). Other cases upholding the 
CSRA using the rational basis test are United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454, 459 (7"' Cir. 1997) 
and United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1225 (5"' Cir. 1997). Or see Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 
1412, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996), upholding constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinic En-
trances Act, a law with no interstate component: "Congress can regulate activities if it has a ra-
tional basis for concluding that they 'substantially affect interstate commerce."' (citation omitted). 
As to that same law, there was the same result in United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 920 
(8"' Cir. 1996). For examples of courts applying the rational basis test in its simplest form in up-
holding a ban on the sale of a machine gun, whether intra or interstate, see United States v. Beuck-
elaere, 91 F.3d 781, 783-84 (6"' Cir. 1996), United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 886 (7"' Cir. 
1996) and United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11"' Cir. 1997). Or see Oxford House-C 
v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249, 251 (8"' Cir. 1996), upholding Fair Housing Act prohibition on 
handicap discrimination with no interstate commerce component. For an even more recent exam-
ple, see Liu v. Striuli, 36 F.Supp.2d 452, 477 (D.R.I 1999): "First, the Court must determine 
whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the regulated activity affects interstate 
commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557." 
8. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (emphasis added). Significantly, this is the only direct use of 
the word "rational" in the majority opinion. The dissenting opinions use the word like catsup at a 
children's party at McDonald's. 
9. This test is also commonly called the "affectation test." It flows from a combination of 
the commerce clause and the necessary and proper clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18. In 
addition to its enumerated powers, including the power to regulate commerce among the several 
states, the necessary and proper clause allows Congress to choose means to carry out its enumer-
ated powers provided only that the means bear a necessary and proper relationship to the enumer-
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rational basis test. As Justice Breyer for the dissent concludes, "[t]hus, 
the specific question before us, as the Court recognizes, is not whether 
the 'regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce,' but, 
rather, whether Congress could have had 'a rational basis' for so con-
cluding. ,>Jo Not until the March 199911 Fourth Circuit en bane decision, 
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 12 did 
the Lopez case have any significant impact at the Circuit Court level. 13 
ated powers. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 355 (1819), Chief Justice John 
Marshall held that a synonymous term for necessary and proper was "appropriate." This is the 
word chosen for the enumerated power provisions in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
(1937), the Court used the phrase "close and substantial affect" to define when Congress could 
regulate local or intrastate activity as an appropriate or necessary and proper means of protecting 
interstate commerce. 
Although the test predated Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., it is the modern case most com-
monly cited for this test. The Court, in rejecting the then-fashionable narrow view of federal 
power, said, "[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if 
they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential 
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied 
the power to exercise that control." 301 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added). Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp. is a seminal case in that it abandoned a narrow view of federal power which had been com-
mon since the 1895 case United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895), and went back instead 
to the expansive view of federal power found in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. 
Maryland as to federal enumerated power generally and to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
1 (1824), as to the commerce power specifically. The year 1937, in which Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp. was decided, is also highly significant. In that same year, the Court disavowed the use of 
the due process clause to closely scrutinize state regulation of economic and social issues in West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Both Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. and West 
Coast Hotel taken together are viewed as evidence that the Court had abandoned its attempt to im-
pose a laissez fa ire view of government vis-a-vis business as national policy. Rather, it was up to 
the political branches to decide what our economic policies would be. Not coincidentally, United 
States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), was decided the following year. See infra note 
21 for a discussion of this connection. 
10. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 617 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
11. At the time this article is being written, it is not yet known if review by the U.S. Su-
preme Court of this significant case will be sought or, if so, whether the Court will grant certio-
rari. Thus far the Court has turned down numerous opportunities to clarify Lopez. 
12. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999). The district court in Brzonkala, 935 F.Supp. 779 (W.D. 
Va. 1996), found the civil aspect of Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) outside of congres-
sional commerce power. Brzonkala was reversed by a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit, 132 
F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), but the decision was vacated and the district court holding of unconstitu-
tionality reinstated after an en bane hearing, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999). 
13. Whatever impact there was is not very evident at the circuit court level with Brzonkala 
being the only successful challenge. Some recent circuit court decisions have, however, limited the 
application of federal laws possibly to avoid potential constitutional conflicts with Lopez. See, e.g., 
United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 
328 (lith Cir. 1996) (refusing to apply the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 444(i) to primarily 
intrastate activities). See infra note 110 for a recent case granting cert on this issue. See also 
United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (expressing doubt about the Clean Water 
Act's consistency with Lopez, but construing the statute to avoid the issue). A few district courts 
have struck federal laws down as contrary to Lopez. In addition to the district court in Brzonkala, 
the district court in Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F.Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C. 1996) found the Freedom of 
Access to Clinic Entrances Act, protecting access to abortion clinics, outside the scope of com-
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Brzonkala held that the civil portion14 of the Violence Against Women 
Act (VA W A), giving a civil rights action to women who were abused 
because of their gender, was outside of federal power. 15 Brzonkala was 
clearly a minority approach among the federal courts. 16 Lopez and the 
plethora of lower court federal cases generated by it, 17 especially 
Brzonkala, have made McClung and the misapplication of the rational 
basis test relevant again. 
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Article develops the errors of the McClung rational basis ap-
proach, examines the modest Lopez retreat, and briefly notes 
Brzonkala's recent elevation of the "substantially affects" test. In sum-
mary, this Article will argue that, prior to McClung, there were only 
two kinds of federal power: the power to regulate anything involving 
the crossing of state lines and the power to regulate local activity sub-
stantially affecting interstate commerce. McClung added a third: the 
merce power but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 126 F.3d 575 (4th Cir. 1997). (Both Hunt 
and Brzonkala also raised issues involving Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.) See also United States v. Olin Corp, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) (reversing a 
decision of the district court that the Super Fund Act was unconstitutional as applied to a wholly 
intrastate hazardous waste site); United States v. Mussari, 95 F3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing 
the district court's holding that the Child Support Recovery Act was outside of federal commerce 
power). 
14. Interestingly, the criminal and the civil portions of VAWA are premised upon different 
aspects of federal power. The criminal portion requires that the crossing of interstate lines be a 
part of the crime while the civil portion is said to be based upon the substantial affect on interstate 
commerce. The criminal portion was found to be within federal power in United States v. Bailey, 
112 F. 3d 758 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 240 (1997): 
The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it has long been settled, is 
within the regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause of the Constitu-
tion, and the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free 
from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open 
to question. 
/d. at 766. Accord United States v. Page, 167 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 1999). See infra note 27 for a 
discussion of Congress' power to regulate things crossing state lines. 
15. The Brzonkala court found that the act was not within the scope of either Congress' 
commerce power or its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect equal pro-
tection and due process rights. See supra note 5 and infra Part IV. 
16. Two circuits have found the criminal portion of VA WA within congressional power, 
hut that portion has an interstate component requiring the crossing of state lines. See supra note 
14. Every district court other than the one in Brzonkala's has found the civil portion to be consti-
tutional as well. See, e.g., Liu v. Striuli, 36 F.Supp.2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 
F.Supp.2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F.Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd on 
other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F.Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 
1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F.Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Crisonino v. New York City 
Hous. Auth., 985 F.Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F.Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996). 
17. Over 90 lower federal court cases have specifically addressed Lopez based challenges to 
the applicability of federal laws. Lopez has been cited peripherally over 2000 times. See supra note 
7 and infra note 60 for a sampling of this outpouring of litigation. 
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power of Congress to say that something substantially affected interstate 
commerce, in which case the Court needed to use only a rational basis 
test to determine whether the regulated matter did affect interstate 
commerce. This third test was very different from the second in that no 
actual finding of impact on interstate commerce by the Court had to be 
made. It was enough that Congress could conceivably believe that there 
was such an impact. Even in those instances where Congress had made 
no actual finding of impact on interstate commerce, the Court simply 
began to ask the question whether there was a rational basis for Con-
gress to believe that the regulated activity substantially affected inter-
state commerce. No longer was the Court significantly involved in the 
federalist issue. 
Lopez on its face did little or nothing to change the McClung ap-
proach. In fact, only where any connection to commerce was patently 
absurd did the Court play any limiting role. Essentially, almost any im-
pact on commercial interest was enough to satisfy the Court. Despite 
the hopeful glimmer of federalism found in some of the district court 
opinions, the circuit courts, with the Brzonkala exception, have limited 
Lopez to its facts. 
III. THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST 
In Katzenbach v. McClung, the United States Supreme Court held 
that Congress had the authority to regulate, under its commerce power, 
racial discrimination by Ollie's Barbecue, a family owned restaurant in 
Birmingham, Alabama. Congress had made a conclusive presumption 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that racial discrimination by certain 
businesses which either served interstate travelers or purchased sub-
stantial goods in interstate commerce had a per se impact on interstate 
commerce. 18 However, unlike its companion case, Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 19 there was no claim that interstate travelers fre-
quented Ollie's restaurant. Instead, the commerce power over Ollie's 
came from the fact that forty-six percent of the $150,000 worth of food 
which Ollie's purchased annually was meat purchased from a local sup-
plier who had purchased it out of state. As for Ollie's claim that there 
was no real proof that racial discrimination actually impacted the flow 
of such food, the Court said that "where we find that the legislators, in 
light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for 
18. Sections 201(b)(2) and (c) of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 
places any "restaurant ... principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises" 
under the Act "if ... it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the 
food which it serves ... has moved in commerce." 
19. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of 
commerce, our investigation is at an end. "20 Therefore, the only job for 
the Court was to determine whether Ollie's had purchased "a substan-
tial portion" of its food in interstate commerce. Ollie's admitted that it 
had. 
Beginning21 in 1938 with United States v. Carolene Products Co. ,22 
the United States Supreme Court has applied the rational basis test to a 
variety of situations. 23 From Carolene comes a common phrasing24 of 
that test: 
20. McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-4. 
21. Claiming that the rational basis test begins with Carolene Products is true only in the 
sense that Carolene is a sign post case in which the rational basis test eclipsed the historically par-
allel reasonable basis test. The rational basis phrase and variations of the test were used by the 
Supreme Court well before Carotene. One of the earliest uses of the rational basis phrase at the 
Supreme Court level in a due process or equal protection case is Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. 
Brickell, 233 U.S. 304, 316 (1914): "The state has a wide range of discretion with respect to es-
tablishing classes for the purpose of imposing revenue taxes, and its laws upon the subject are not 
to be set aside as discriminatory unless it clearly appears that there is no rational basis for the clas-
sification." An early use of a version of the rational basis test similar to Carotene is Ohio v. 
Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 397 (1927): 
It is enough for present purposes that the ordinance, in the light of facts admitted or 
generally assumed, does not preclude the possibility of a rational basis for the legisla-
tive judgment and that we have no such knowledge of local conditions as would enable 
us to say that it is clearly wrong. 
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), also predated Carolene and although it did not 
specifically use the rational basis test, it is the seminal case in limiting judicial review as to due 
process and economic legislation: 
[I]f such laws "have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are nei-
ther arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied"; that 
"with the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law 
f!nacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal"; that 
"times without number we have said that the legislature is primarily the judge of the 
necessity of such an enactment, that every possible presumption is in favor of its valid-
ity, and that though the court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, 
it may not be annulled unless palpably in excess of legislative power." 
300 U.S. at 398 (citations omitted). 
22. 304 u.s. 144 (1938). 
23. Absent fundamental rights and suspect classifications, it is the principal test in deter-
mining whether most substantive due process and equal protection rights have been violated. See 
the cases mentioned in infra note 26. 
24. The version of the rational basis test in Carolene has its origin in Metropolitan Casualty 
Ins. Co. of New York v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935): 
It is a salutary principle of judicial decision, long emphasized and followed by this 
Court, that the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on him 
who assails it, and that courts may not declare a legislative discrimination invalid un-
less, viewed in the light of facts made known or generally assumed, it is of such a char-
acter as to preclude the assumption that the classification rests upon some rational basis 
within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. [Footnote with 14 string cites 
omitted.] A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. 
(citations omitted). 
Interestingly, Carotene cites Metropolitan Casualty "and cases cited" but only one of the 
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"[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial 
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the 
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a 
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some ra-
tional basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. "25 
7 
Other cases have emphasized that the rational basis test is met if the 
legislature had any conceivable justification for it. 26 
There is a three-part logic to the rational basis test. First, courts 
have no knowledge superior to that of the legislative branch in making 
societal choices as to most non-fundamental issues. Second, if the leg-
islator makes mistakes of judgment in passing laws, the legislative pro-
cess can be trusted to correct any past legislative mistakes. Third, since 
no fundamental rights are involved, no harm great enough to justify 
court interference with the legislative process is done in waiting for the 
self-correcting legislative process to fix its own mistakes. Of course, 
each of these assumptions about the rational basis test is doubtful, 27 but 
fourteen cases cited in the omitted Metropolitan Casualty footnote actually used the rational basis 
test. Most used the then more common "reasonable basis" framing of the test. But the one case 
cited by Metropolitan Casualty that actually used the rational basis test, Hardware Dealers' Mutual 
Fire Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Glidden, 284 U.S. 151, 158-59 (1931), has language similar to 
Carolene: 
The record and briefs present no facts disclosing the reasons for the enactment of the 
present legislation or the effects of its operation, but as it deals with a subject within the 
scope of the legislative power, the presumption of constitutionality is to be indulged. 
We cannot assume that the Minnesota legislature did not have knowledge of conditions 
supporting its judgment that the legislation was in the public interest, and it is enough 
that, when the statute is read in the light of circumstances generally known to attend the 
recovery of fire insurance losses, the possibility of a rational basis for the legislative 
judgment is not excluded. 
(citations omitted). 
Despite the language in Metropolitan Casualty, before Carolene there was often at least 
some effort made at establishing some actual rational basis. For example, in Borden's Farm Prod-
ucts Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934), the Court applied the rational basis test to a minimum 
milk price scheme that allowed less well known brands to charge one cent more per gallon than 
heavily promoted brands. It said that the economic assertions for the different pricing schemes, 
which were the claimed rational basis for the law, were properly "the subject of evidence and of 
findings" and remanded the case. !d. at 210. 
25. Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 (citing Metropolitan Casuality Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 
U.S. 580, 584 (1935)). 
26. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (upholding as rational 
Oklahoma's regulation of the optometry business even if such laws were found to be "needless, 
wasteful requirement[s]"); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (upholding mandatory retire-
ment law for overseas federal State Department employees but not for essentially similar Civil 
Service employees); Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding 
California's denial of the parental rights of a natural father based upon the irrebuttable presump-
tion that the husband was the father of the child despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary). 
27. Carolene itself is an example of why these assumptions are speculative at best. There, 
Congress banned the interstate transportation of milk-filled products, including a low-priced milk 
substitute called Milnut made from skim milk-then a largely valueless byproduct of butter and 
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whether the test is justified in other settings or not, the Court has mis-
used it in defining the scope of federal power. 
The logic that legislative mistakes can easily be corrected through 
the use of the political processes and thus there is no need for activist 
judicial intervention, whether justified in other areas of the law or not, 
certainly does not work with regard to the division of power between 
the federal government and the states. It is Congress' natural tendency 
to undertake more and more legislative power. It wants to appear to be 
doing something, and the notion that there are areas outside the scope 
of Congress' enumerated powers is not something easily communicated 
to the public. If the public is concerned about carjacking, Congress 
makes it a federal crime. What is the point of telling the public that 
state laws are adequate for the problem and that most car-jacking is un-
related to federal enumerated power? There is no political virtue in re-
straint in the face of perceived danger when any action, even unneces-
sary action, carries the impression that Congress is doing something to 
address the danger. While Congress may have little stomach to address 
real issues in America-bloated and unnecessary defense facilities, an 
illogical and unfair tax structure, an insolvent Social Security system-
it is always on the ready to address the fashionable concern of the mo-
ment, particularly when state laws may already adequately handle that 
concern-e.g., guns on school property, violence against women, and 
juvenile crime.Z8 For the Court to apply a rational basis test to deter-
mine if Congress is correct when Congress says that it has enumerated 
power is judicial abdication of one of the Court's most important re-
sponsibilities: reconciling the separation of powers between the state 
and federal governments. There are no political processes which re-
strain Congress. It has all the motivation in the world to define its pow-
ers broadly, and none to impose limits on its self. It is the Court that 
must take responsibility for the balance of power between the federal 
cheese production-and coconut oil. It had the advantage over regular milk in that it was low 
priced and did not need to be refrigerated, a matter of some importance in the days of "ice boxes." 
The facts indicated that the product was every bit as healthy-or given its fat content as un-
healthy-as regular milk, but the Court upheld the congressional ban as being rationally related to 
concern for health and perhaps the danger of passing it off as real milk. It would have been very 
easy for the Court to have determined that the ban on such products was the result of the dairy 
industry's jealousy and that there was no legitimate justification for it. The likelihood that poor 
people of this country were going to be sufficiently organized to overturn this law generated by the 
dairy industry lobby is, of course, patently ridiculous, confirmed by the fact that many such pro-
dairy laws exist to this day. 
28. This is not to say that these are not subjects which are in need of legislation. The point 
is that state laws likely regulate each of these and to the degree that they are inadequate, the state 
legislature should be held responsible. There is little need for Congress to pass largely parallel 
legislation. 
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government and the states, and the rational basis test is the ultimate 
failure to meet that responsibility. 
IV. MCCLUNG AND THE ENUMERATED POWER TO REGULATE 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
McClung was questionable the day that it was decided and has sur-
prisingly little historical support. Joining McClung is its younger sib-
ling, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 29 which also misapplied the rational basis 
test. In Morgan, 30 the Court held that Congress, under the enumerated 
power given it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, had the authority to ban literacy tests for persons who had 
"successfully completed the sixth primary grade [in a school in Puerto 
Rico and elsewhere] in which the predominant classroom language was 
other than English. "31 Section 5 provides that Congress can pass "ap-
propriate legislation" to carry into effect the provisions of Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, citing McCulloch v. Mary-
land,32 said that "appropriate" meant "plainly adapted." One of the 
provisions of Section 1 is that no state may deny equal protection 
rights. (The Civil Rights Casel3 mentioned above involved private, not 
state, equal protection violations.) The state of New York argued that 
under then controlling Supreme Court precedents34 literacy tests did not 
29. 384 u.s. 641 (1966) 
30. See id. 
31. The full text of section 4(e) is as follows: 
(I) Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
of persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant classroom lan-
guage was other than English, it is necessary to prohibit the States from conditioning 
the right to vote of such persons on ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any 
matter in the English language. 
(2) No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a 
public school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, 
or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other than 
English, shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his 
inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language, except that in 
States in which State law provides that a different level of education is presumptive of literacy, he 
shall demonstrate that he has successfully completed an equivalent level of education in a public 
school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other than Eng-
lish. 
79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (Supp. I 1964). 
32. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
33. See supra note 5. 
34. Among other cases cited in support of this approach was Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, the companion case to McClung with McClung being the first case to use the ra-
tional basis test for determining the scope of federal power. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 n.ll. Heart 
of Atlanta itself does not actually use the rational basis phrase but the test is implied: "How ob-
structions in commerce may be removed-what means are to be employed-is within the sound and 
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violate the Fourteenth Amendment and thus Congress had no authority 
under Section 5 to ban them. The Court held that the congressional 
finding that literacy tests did at least indirectly impact the equal protec-
tion rights of Puerto Rican citizens was conclusive: "It is not for us to 
review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that 
we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve 
the conflict as it did. "35 While the Court did not actually use the phrase 
"rational basis," this was quite clearly the test that it was using in de-
termining when congressional findings were sufficient to satisfy the 
"appropriate/plainly adapted" requirement of Section 5. 36 
At the time that McClung was decided, there were two basic ap-
proaches37 to determining the scope of the federal commerce power. 
exclusive discretion of the Congress. It is subject only to one caveat-that the means chosen by it 
must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
379 U.S. at 262. 
35. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653. 
36. See id. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), finding the Religious Free-
dom Reformation Act outside the scope of federal Section 5 power, the Court limited the expan-
sive view of Section 5 power found in Morgan. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University, 169 F.3d 820 (4'• Cir. 1999), following Boerne, found the Violence Against 
Women Act, outside the scope of Section 5 power. Boerne and Lopez join two Tenth Amendment 
intergovernmental cases, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997), in elevating the profile of federalism issues in recent years. 
37. The Court in Lopez lists "three broad categories." They are as follows: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. . . . Sec-
ond, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may 
come only from intrastate activities .... Finally, Congress' commerce authority in-
cludes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commence, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted). Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971), 
is the first case to use these three categories without any citation. Interestingly, it misstates the 
third as "affecting interstate commerce," not substantially affecting. To the lower courts, one of 
the most important aspects of Lopez is its reprise of the Perez division of federal power into three 
parts, channels of commerce, instrumentalities including things in commerce, and regulating things 
that substantially affect interstate commerce. While the two-power view of federal power is con-
ceptually neater than the three-power view, nothing ofreal importance is impacted either way. The 
first category seems primarily the regulation of things crossing state lines. The third category is 
the "substantial affects" power. The second category, to the degree that it includes persons or 
things in interstate commerce, is the power to regulate things crossing state lines. To the degree 
that it includes intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce, it falls within the power to 
regulate things affecting interstate commerce. 
Although this Article stubbornly eschews the three categories of Lopez in favor of two 
categories, the lower courts widely quote these three categories as defining the scope of the federal 
commerce power. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 583 (4'" Cir. 1997) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) despite the fact that it 
criminalizes the blocking of access to abortion clinics and has no apparent contact with interstate 
commerce); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress 
had the authority to make criminal the possession of all machine guns, whether there was any 
proven movement in interstate commerce or not); United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1226 
(5th Cir. 1997) (upholding the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA) which makes it a crime for an 
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First, Congress had the power to regulate anything crossing state lines38 
and second, Congress had the power to regulate anything that substan-
tially affected interstate commerce. McClung and Heart of Atlanta Mo-
out-of-state parent not to pay child support). The unhelpfulness of the three categories is revealed 
in Wright which says that it agrees with the Third Circuit, United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 
(3d Cir. 1996) and Seventh Circuit, United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884 (7tll Cir. 1996), that the 
regulation of in-state machine guns falls within the third category, and not the Sixth Circuit, 
United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781 (6tll Cir. 1996) and the Ninth Circuit, United States v. 
Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9tll Cir. 1996) which found it within the first category, and not the Tenth 
Circuit, United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (lOtll Cir. 1995) which found it within the second 
category and not the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791 (5tll Cir. 1995) which found 
it within both the first and second. Only an experienced short-order cook or an air-traffic control-
ler at Kennedy airport could keep track of the various permutations. Which category it falls within 
hardly matters since the rational basis test is then used whichever of the three categories the court 
concludes is involved. See, however, Bailey, supra, where the majority found the CSRA rationally 
related to both the first and second categories, but the dissent, agreeing with the district court, is 
premised upon it not being rationally related to the third category. Note that the Tenth Circuit, 
United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999 (10"' Cir. 1996), found it within the third category and 
constitutional. 
38. Though potentially far-reaching in scope, this regulatory poser is generally the most 
limited form of federal power since it involves the actual crossing of state lines in at least some 
form, but as the power has evolved the crossing can be coincidental, and thus the power has bur-
geoned. Many of the uses of this power are odd to the extreme. For example, under the criminal 
portion of VA WA, the federal law requires that a person must have crossed state lines to abuse a 
spouse, whereas under the civil provision the abuse only had to affect interstate commerce. 
Crossing state lines is such an irrelevancy in terms of federal concern that one wonders why Con-
gress was so brazen in its claim of power for the civil provision and so technical as to the criminal 
portion. Also, see the discussion of carjacking and the crossing of state lines in the text at infra 
note 70-73 where it is argued that the crossing of state lines is such a de minimis part of the crime 
as to be almost pointless. It is the form of federal power used in much of the federal criminal leg-
islation, making illegal the transportation in interstate commerce every thing from lottery tickets, 
The Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames) 188 U.S. 321 (1903), to yellow oleo margarine, McCray v. 
United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904), to adulterated foods and drugs, Hipolite Egg Company v. 
United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911), to women for immoral purposes, Caminetti v. United States, 
242 U.S. 470 (1917). When Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 
189-90 (1824), said that commerce included "commercial intercourse ... in all its branches," he 
probably did not have the latter in mind where the defendant traveled with his girlfriend from Sac-
ramento, California to Reno, Nevada. See the criminal portion of the VA W A premised on this 
power. See supra note 14. For an interesting VAWA case, see United States v. Page, 167 F.3d 
325 (6tll Cir. 1999), an en bane decision involving an equally divided court, which found the 
criminal portion constitutional. The oddest part of the case is the division of the court over 
whether violence has to occur after the interstate commerce took place or if it could occur before 
the interstate commerce actually took place. 
Congress also attempted to use this power when there was uncertainty about its other com-
merce powers, unsuccessfully in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), but successfully in 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The limiting aspects of this power are revealed in 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186 (1974), where an intrastate asphaltic con-
crete processor sued two interstate asphalt companies for price discrimination in favor of a local 
in-state competitor. The Federal Robinson-Patman Act requires that the discrimination be "in 
commerce." The Court said this meant that an effect on interstate commerce was not enough, that 
one of the discriminatory sales transactions had to actually cross state lines. Since the asphalt was 
used for interstate highways, it is not that Congress could not have passed a law within its com-
merce power, rather, Congress, either through accident or design, limited the application of the 
law to the actual crossing of state lines. 
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tel added a third approach: Congress could say that certain things had a 
substantial impact on interstate commerce and the Court would uphold 
the congressional conclusion, if there was any rational basis in support 
of its conclusion. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Congress said that in the 
interstate travel provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 racial dis-
crimination by hotels and inns serving interstate travelers impacted in-
terstate commerce. In McClung, Congress said that racial discrimina-
tion by businesses buying a substantial amount of food in interstate 
commerce impacted interstate commerce. As to both of these conclu-
sions, the Court itself did not undertake any factual evaluation of these 
congressional claims, finding ample support in testimony before con-
gressional committees. Under the rational basis test, it was enough that 
it was conceivable that racial discrimination impacted interstate com-
merce; it was not any thing that had to actually be proven. 
The approach in these two cases should be contrasted with Wickard 
v. Filburn, 39 which is widely thought to be one of the most extreme ex-
amples of Congress' use of its commerce power. In Wickard, Congress 
allocated how much wheat each farmer could grow and sought sanc-
tions against Farmer Filburn for growing 239 bushels too much wheat, 
wheat which Farmer Filburn grew and consumed on his own farm. In 
Wickard, the Court stated the applicable commerce test requires that 
Farmer Filburn's actions have a substantial impact on interstate com-
merce. It found that impact by looking at the aggregate, or class impact 
of homegrown and home-consumed wheat on the interstate and interna-
tional market of wheat. Wickard is not a case in which the Court as-
sumed that even the most de minimis impact on interstate commerce 
was enough to bring something within federal power. Rather, the trial 
court heard volumes of evidence as to the impact of such wheat on the 
total market for wheat. The evidence revealed that wheat was a very 
volatile market and even small changes in the supply of wheat could 
have a dramatic impact. Furthermore, the aggregate impact of the class 
of homegrown, home-consumed wheat was anything but small. De-
pending on the market price of wheat, such wheat had a variability 
factor of more than 20%. The Court in Wickard did not simply assume 
that commerce was hurt because Congress might conceivably believe 
that it would. Extensive evidence introduced in open court proved that 
impact. 
The prominent test, prior to Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung, 
not involving the actual crossing of state lines, was that there had to be 
39. 317 u.s. 111 (1942). 
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some substantial impact on interstate commerce. 40 That test could easily 
have been passed in Heart of Atlanta Motel. The use of the rational ba-
sis test is far more significant in McClung than in Heart of Atlanta Mo-
tel. 41 Given the overwhelming testimony before Congress, it is easy to 
believe it could have been proven that racial discrimination by busi-
nesses serving interstate travelers did have a substantial impact on inter-
state commerce. Black business persons and even black tourists will 
find it very difficult to travel interstate if they cannot find lodging and 
food. Given the accepted fact that Ollie's did not serve interstate travel-
ers, it is not as easy to see the impact on interstate commerce from ra-
cial discrimination by such businesses. Ollie's family-owned barbecue 
40. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar, 334 U.S. 219, 234 
(1948): 
For, given a restraint of the type forbidden by the Act, though arising in the course of 
intrastate or local activities, and a showing of actual or threatened effect upon interstate 
commerce, the vital question becomes whether the effect is sufficiently substantial and 
adverse to Congress' paramount policy declared in the Act's terms to constitute a for-
bidden consequence. 
See also United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); United States v. Darby, 
312 U.S. 100 (1941); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); Consolidated Edison Co. of New 
York v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). 
41. The Court's use of the rational basis test in Heart of Atlanta Motel is at best half-
hearted. Throughout the opinion, the Court refers to the close and substantial affects or just sub-
stantial affects test of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. Finally, towards the end of the opinion, it 
states that the act does not violate liberty or property rights protected "under the Fifth Amend-
ment," apparently referring to due process rights. It then states that the power is within Congress' 
commerce power and that the questions are, first, "whether Congress had a rational basis for 
finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce" and, second, if so, "whether the 
means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate." It then concludes with ex-
tensive cites that the Court had held consistently that such laws do not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process clause. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258-59. This two-part ap-
proach and its combination of enumerated commerce powers issues with the due process clause is 
at best confusing. In the first, the Court must find that Congress could have rationally concluded 
that the local activity, racial discrimination, affected interstate commerce. Regulating racial dis-
crimination is the means chosen to protect interstate commerce. It's not clear what the point of the 
second test is, but it appears to be a reference to substantive due process. The Court repeats it at 
the end of its opinion when it summarizes its holding, first concluding that the law was within 
Congress' commerce power and then stating that the means chosen by Congress to remove ob-
structions in commerce is solely within congressional discretion "subject only to one caveat-that 
the means chosen by it must be reasonably adopted to the end permitted by the Constitution." !d. 
at 262. Although this language is widely quoted, it is not clear whether it is an alternative com-
merce clause test or a reference to its due process discussion. In any event, it has not been given 
any gloss separate from the rational basis test. If intended as a reference to the due process clause, 
the more common phrasing is that the means must only rationally relate to legitimate governmental 
ends. The requirement of a "reasonable connection" while sometimes used synonymously with 
rational is actually a stricter level of review which predates the emphasis on rational basis. Com-
pare Weaver v. Palmer Bothers, 270 U.S. 402 (1926), applying the reasonable basis test and find-
ing invalid a state ban on shoddy stuffing made from used fabrics, with United States v. Carolene 
Products applying the rational basis test and upholding a ban on milk filled products. See also the 
reasonable basis language used in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), as a precursor to the stricter 
middle level test of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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was not the kind of place that interstate travelers tend to choose. The 
proven mediocrity of McDonald's or Denny's is more the preferred 
fare to the uncertain results of venturing off the interstate highway and 
sampling local delicacies. Although Ollie's is now of some renown, 
having been featured on CNN International News as a recommended 
spot for businesspersons seeking something a little different, this was 
not the case at the time. 
Despite the obvious hatefulness of the racial discrimination by Ol-
lie's, a situation that had existed since its opening in 1927, the power of 
Congress to regulate it is far from clear. Because private action was in-
volved, Congress, under controlling precedents, did not have regulatory 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 And as for the 
commerce clause, what was the impact on interstate commerce? Ollie's 
sold all of the barbecue that it could possibly sell. Its 200 plus sit-down 
service sold to whites only, but its take-out service did a thriving busi-
ness to blacks. There was no direct evidence of any kind that, but for 
Ollie's racial discrimination, it would have sold more pork sandwiches 
and homemade pies and thus, have purchased more food in interstate 
commerce. The Court referred to the testimony before Congress of an 
Under Secretary of Commerce that attributed lower restaurant spending 
in the South to racial discrimination. The equal possibility, that any dif-
ferences were the result of the Southern inclination to eat more meals at 
home, did not deter the Court from concluding, "[t]his diminutive 
spending springing from refusal to serve Negroes and their total loss as 
customers has, regardless of the absence of direct evidence, a close 
connection to interstate commerce. "43 The Court also referred to "many 
references [in Congressional testimony] to discriminatory situations 
causing wide unrest and having a depressant effect on general business 
conditions in the respective communities. "44 Despite these possible 
connections to interstate commerce, the Court relied primarily on stud-
ies indicating that racial discrimination made it harder for blacks to 
travel interstate, an irrelevancy as far as the assumed facts in Ollie's. 
Ollie's did not serve interstate travelers. It was subject to regulation 
42. See the discussion of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment power in supra note 5 
where I express my agreement with Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel 
and McClung that Congress had the power to pass this provision using Section 5. It is not the law 
that I object to or even to federal interference within this area of state influence. In fact, I believe 
that the Fourteenth Amendment intended for Congress to take the lead in eliminating both state and 
private racism. My objections are much simpler. I do not believe that there is commerce power, 
and I think there is something to be said for complying with the constitutional scheme of enumer-
ated powers although the precise reason for doing so has eluded me. 
43. McClung, 379 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added). 
44. !d. at 300. 
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only if on other grounds its racial discrimination substantially affected 
interstate commerce. 
The only real possibility in Ollie's for proving substantial impact on 
interstate commerce was by use of the aggregate or class impact gloss 
on that requirement. Wickard v. Filburn is the classic illustration of the 
use of the aggregate impact application. Farmer Filburn by himself 
grew 239 too many bushels of wheat. Even given the probable uncer-
tainty as to our understanding of what a bushel is, it's difficult to be-
lieve that Farmer Filburn by himself had much of an impact on the in-
ternational or interstate market in wheat. Nonetheless, looking at the 
aggregate impact of the class of homegrown and home-consumed 
wheat-with a variability factor of 20%-indicated a clear and substan-
tial impact in what was described as a volatile market. In Ollie's case, 
although racial discrimination by Ollie's itself certainly did not have a 
substantial impact on interstate purchases of food, the inquiry focused 
on the aggregate impact on interstate purchases by Ollie's class: restau-
rants that purchased goods interstate and discriminated based upon race. 
Surely racial discrimination by restaurants will lead to fewer blacks 
frequenting such restaurants generally, and thus the aggregate impact of 
such discrimination on the amount of food purchased could be substan-
tial. There are factual problems with this scenario in that it is hard to 
see the overall impact on interstate commerce. Such discrimination 
might lead to more sales by restaurants that did not discriminate or 
more sales by grocery stores to blacks choosing to eat at home as op-
posed to being faced with racial discrimination. However, it is hard to 
see an impact on interstate commerce since the amount of food con-
sumed is likely to be unchanged; what would be affected is the locale 
where the food is eaten. 
Also, factually there was no attempt to prove that Ollie's was part 
of the class of restaurants where discrimination would have affected 
interstate commerce. Because its discrimination impacted only its sit-
down service, Ollie's had the best of both worlds. Any white customers 
could freely frequent its sit-down service and any racially excluded per-
son could purchase from its take-out service. There was no evidence at 
all that resentment of their exclusion from the sit -down service led to 
potential black customers eschewing the tasty pork sandwiches from the 
take-out window. While some restaurants may sell less food because of 
racial discrimination and the aggregate impact of that group may have a 
substantial impact on interstate commerce, Ollie's was not necessarily a 
part of that class. In fact, Ollie's argued that because of its location in a 
black neighborhood, it would lose its white customers if it did not ex-
clude blacks from its sit-down service. By mentioning this argument, 
16 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 14 
there is no intent here to defend its legitimacy or to detract from its 
odiousness. Rather, as a commerce clause class action issue, there is 
little likelihood that Ollie's discrimination actually impacted commerce 
at all. As a class, a million times zero is still zero. 
Finally, although the Court referred to language from the Wickard 
case about the aggregate impact, there is no indication from the case 
that the aggregate impact doctrine was the basis for the holding of fed-
eral power in the case. The rational basis test, requiring only that it be 
conceivable that Congress could have believed that there be such an 
impact, made it unnecessary to undertake even the factual inquiry 
which the aggregate impact test requires. 
McClung is similar to the liberal finding of congressional power in 
the later case of Perez v. United States. 45 In Perez, federal law made 
loan sharking a federal crime. Congress, using its commerce clause 
power, concluded that the aggregate impact of loan-sharking as a class 
contributed to organized crime and that organized crime had a substan-
tial impact on interstate commerce. Perez's defense was that he was an 
independent entrepreneur and as such he was not a part of the class 
contributing to organized crime. (Indeed, the federal law did not re-
quire any actual proof of a connection to such a class.) The Court's re-
sponse to this argument admits its validity: "Where the class of activi-
ties is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the 
courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the 
class. Extortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in 
the judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce. "46 Justice Stewart 
in dissent argued that Perez did not pass the rational basis test: 
In order to sustain this law we would, in my view, have to be able at 
the least to say that Congress could rationally have concluded that 
loan sharking is an activity with interstate attributes that distinguish it 
in some substantial respect from other local crime. But it is not 
enough to say that loan sharking is a national problem, for all crime is 
a national problem. It is not enough to say that some loan sharking 
has interstate characteristics, for any crime may have an interstate 
setting. And the circumstance that loan sharking has an adverse im-
pact on interstate business is not a distinguishing attribute, for inter-
state business suffers from almost all criminal activity, be it shoplift-
ing or violence in the streets. 47 
I actually see more of a connection in Perez to interstate commerce 
than in McClung. Perhaps Congress may have thought that proving any 
45. 402 u.s. 146 (1971). 
46. !d. at 154 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
47. /d. at 157-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
001] FEDERALISM AND THERA TIONAL BASIS TEST 17 
actual connection to organized crime, given its shadowy nature, may 
have made it hard to prosecute loan sharks that did contribute to the 
profits of organized crime. In order to make it easier to prosecute af-
filiated loan sharks, Congress could punish all loan sharks. There was 
not even this type of connection in McClung. 
The Court in McClung for the first time48 relied exclusively on the 
rational basis test in finding a law within the enumerated power of 
Congress. Although stating that the mere fact that Congress said that 
something affected interstate commerce did not "preclude further ex-
amination by this Court, "49 it then stated such a deferential level of re-
view as to cause doubt on that qualification. It stated, "where we find 
that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have 
a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the 
protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end. "50 The Court 
also said there was no requirement that Congress make any specific or 
formal findings as to any actual impact on commerce. In perhaps the 
most telling citation in the opinion, it wrote ominously, "see United 
States v. Carotene Products Co. "51 The apparent reference was to this 
language: 
Even in the absence of such aids [specific legislative findings] the ex-
istence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, 
for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is 
not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts 
made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to pre-
clude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators. 52 
Although the Carotene Products case has a commerce clause issue 
in it, this quote is not in reference to the commerce clause, but rather to 
the claim that the federal law in that case violated substantive due proc-
ess rights. 
McClung cites United States v. Darbi3 for the proposition that it is 
enough that there is some rational basis in support of Congress' finding 
that something substantially affects interstate commerce. However, 
Darby does not support this proposition. The Court in McClung cites 
the following language from Darby: 
48. The Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the companion case, mentioned the rational basis 
test but in an ambiguous, confusing context. See supra note 34. 
49. McClung, 379 U.S. at 303. 
50. /d. at 379. 
51. /d. at 304. 
52. Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152. 
53. 312 u.s. 100 (1941). 
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[S]ometimes Congress itself has said that a particular activity affects 
the commerce, as it did in the present Act, the Safety Appliance Act 
and the Railway Labor Act. In passing on the validity of the legisla-
tion of the class last mentioned the only function of courts is to deter-
mine whether the particular activity regulated or prohibited is within 
the reach of the federal power. 54 
From this language, the McClung Court concluded that Darby 
stands for the proposition that a rational basis connection between local 
activity and interstate commerce is enough. But of course, Darby said 
no such thing. Although Congress made certain legislative findings in 
Darby as to the impact on interstate commerce, the Court in the cited 
passage clearly states that it had the responsibility for determining if the 
"particular activity regulated or prohibited is within the reach of the 
federal power. "55 The applicable test at the time of Darby was the 
"close and substantial test. "56 The Darby Court states an abbreviated 
version of this test, "[T]his Court had many times held that the power 
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce extends to the regulation 
through legislative action of activities intrastate which have a substantial 
effect on the commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power over 
it. "57 
Historically, Darby has been a commerce power case of immense 
importance. Darby involved principally the constitutionality of two 
provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act. The first provision said that 
any goods made by persons in violation of the mmimum-
wage/maximum-hours limitations of the Act could not be shipped 
through interstate commerce. The second applied the provisions of the 
act to all persons who worked in producing goods for interstate com-
merce. Though the provisions on the surface seem repetitive, that is not 
entirely the case.58 The first provision is an exercise of Congress' 
power over activities crossing state lines; the second provision is an ex-
ercise of its power to regulate local activity having a substantial impact 
on interstate commerce. The first provision was the clearest form of 
federal enumerated power over interstate commerce. For most of the 
54. McClung, 379 U.S. at 303 (citing Darby, 312 U.S. at 120-21) (legislative code sections 
deleted by the McClung Court). 
55. Darby, 312 U.S. at 121-22. 
56. See supra note 9. 
57. Darby, 312 U.S. at 119-20. At this point the Court cited a number of older cases in 
support of this test which it said predated even Jones & Laughlin. See supra note 9. 
58. It is partly the case since at the time the act was passed in 1938, despite the Jones & 
Laughlin case in 1937, the scope of congressional power was far from clear. Congress used both 
of its principal commerce powers in the hope that at least one of them would withstand the Court's 
scrutiny. The lower court in Darby, applying the older cases, quashed Darby's indictment. See 
United States v. Darby, 3 F.Supp. 734 (S.D. Ga. 1940). 
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history of the commerce clause,59 the Court has given Congress the 
plenary power to control the crossing of state borders. This power was 
used to regulate everything from interstate shipment of lottery tickets, 
to interstate shipment of milk substitutes, to interstate drugs, to inter-
state victims of kidnapping. 60 Under the second provision, if any part of 
the production were to be used in interstate commerce, workers were 
protected by the act as to both producing goods for the local market as 
well as the interstate market. 
The second provision, and the one relevant to the McClung case, is 
an example of Congress' ability to regulate local or intrastate activity if 
such activity substantially affects interstate commerce. This provision is 
sometimes called the "affectation doctrine. "61 As early as Gibbons v. 
Ogden62 in 1824, the Court had given an expansive definition of Con-
gress' ability to regulate activities or factors affecting interstate com-
merce. Since 1895 in United States. v. E.C. Knight, 63 the Court had 
59. At the time of the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938, Hammer v. Dagen-
hart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the major exception to this clear historical trend, had not yet been re-
versed. Darby specifically did so. Hammer had found that Congress did not have the commerce 
power to ban the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Although the line of prece-
dents supporting Congress' plenary power over the crossing of state lines seemed insurmountable, 
the Hammer Court strained to distinguish them on a number of grounds, the principle one being 
that even though Congress seemed to be regulating the crossing of state lines, its secret motive was 
to regulate local manufacturing and under the E. C. Knight case, 156 U.S. 1 (1895), this it could 
not do. Darby rejected considerations of motive as relevant in determining Congress' power to 
regulate things crossing state lines: 
The thesis of the [Hammer] opinion that the motive of the prohibition or its effect to 
control in some measure the use or production within the states of the article thus ex-
cluded from the commerce can operate to deprive the regulation of its constitutional 
authority has long since ceased to have force. 
Darby, 312 U.S. at 116. 
60. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (1994) (explosives); 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) (1994 (fire-
arms); 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l) (1994) (kidnapping); 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (1994) (strikebreaking); 18 
U.S.C. § 1301 (1994) (lotteries); 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (obscenity); 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (sexual exploitation of children); 18 U.S.C. § 
2312 (1994) (stolen motor vehicles and aircraft); 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994) (other stolen property); 
18 U.S.C. § 2318 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (counterfeit phonograph records), 18 U.S.C. § 2421 
(1994) (prostitution); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(b)(iii), 2512(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (electronic 
eavesdropping). See also supra note 37 (discussion of this type of federal power). 
61. See supra note 9. 
62. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Chief Justice Marshall, after giving every part of the 
commerce clause an expansive definition, concluded: 
The genius and character of the whole government seem[s] to be, that its action is to be 
applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which 
affect the States generally, but not to those which are completely within a particular 
State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, 
for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. The com-
pletely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State 
itself. 
/d. at 195. 
63. 156 u.s. 1 (1895). 
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undertaken in some cases64 a very limited view of the affectation doc-
trine. Knight held that the then recently passed Sherman Antitrust Act 
had no application to a manufacturer's combination controlling 96% of 
domestic sugar because manufacturing was not interstate commerce. 65 
But in 1937, the Court began the return to the expansive definition of 
commerce in Gibbons, holding that, whether something was commerce 
or not, if it had a close and substantial effect on interstate commerce it 
was within federal power. 66 Darby reaffirmed the legitimacy of the 
Gibbons approach though shortening the test, if not softening it, to re-
quire a substantial effect. It also pointed out that this test predated Jones 
& Laughlin and it rejected the artificiality of the Knight approach. The 
actual substantial effect-or even close and substantial effect-on inter-
state commerce could hardly be less clear in Darby. If goods made for 
intrastate commerce were cheaper because produced by cheap labor, 
they would have a significant competitive advantage over goods moving 
in interstate commerce subject to the first provision of the Fair Labor 
64. The circuit court in Brzonkala described the early holdings in this way: 
The courts of the first era gave an exceedingly narrow definition to the term "com-
merce," unduly restricting congressional power. By distinguishing commerce from 
manufacturing, production, and mining, see, e.g., Carter, (mining is not commerce); 
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., (manufacturing is not commerce), and by separating 
economic activities that directly affect interstate commerce from those that have only 
indirect effects, see, e.g., Schechter Poultry, (wage and hour regulations lack direct 
relation to interstate commerce), the Supreme Court removed even the plainly economic 
activities of mines, manufacturing plants, railroads, and merchants from the sphere of 
regulable "commerce." 
169 F.3d at 894 (citations omitted). 
This limited view of the affectation or close and substantial affects test was found primarily 
in cases involving Congress' regulation of economic and labor matters which was inconsistent with 
the Court's then laissez faire view. In other instances the Court applied the affectation doctrine as 
liberally as suggested by Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden. For example, in the Shreveport Rate 
Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), the Court found that the Interstate Commerce Commission had the 
authority to regulate intrastate railroad rates in Texas because of the possibility that they might 
impact interstate rates from Louisiana to Texas and perhaps beyond. 
65. This view was premised upon the misapplication of Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 
(1888), a case involving state power. In Kidd, the state of Iowa banned the manufacture of alco-
holic beverages within the state, even though for interstate deliveries. At the time there was a pre-
vailing view that states could not regulate interstate commerce at all, so to avoid those precedents 
the Court simply held that manufacturing was not commerce. Although a possibly defensible con-
clusion in terms of state power, the application of the precedent to federal power was totally de-
bilitating to federal power and fundamentally flawed. Even if manufacturing itself was not com-
merce, it could certainly be regulated because of its affect on interstate commerce. The Knight 
Court, however, distinguished between direct and indirect effects, an impossible line divorced 
from the reality of any actual effect on interstate commerce. Jones & Laughlin largely discredited 
the Knight direct/indirect distinction and in Wickard v. Filburn it was specifically disapproved. 
Interestingly, the majority in Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 901, although disapproving of the Knight era 
of cases, attempted to resurrect the direct/indirect test to help determine the kind of effect on inter-
state commerce that might satisfy the substantially affects test. 
66. See supra note 9. 
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Standards Act. 67 Also, the act applied only if goods were "produced for 
interstate commerce. "68 While not the same as many earlier federal 
laws which limited their application to businesses "affecting com-
merce, "69 the act certainly required proof that interstate commerce was 
involved. Darby, unlike McClung, is not an instance where Congress, 
by saying it's so, made it so. And the standard used is most certainly 
not the rational basis test. 
Darby represents both types of Congress' pre-McClung commerce 
power. As discussed previously, Darby regulated local activities that 
substantially impacted interstate commerce; in this instance it was 
manufacturing for in-state use. The Darby court also used the other 
principal type of commerce power: Congress can regulate anything 
crossing state lines (i.e. goods made by persons paid less than the 
minimum wage). As to this type of interstate commerce, there was no 
requirement that there be a substantial effect on, or even that the law 
rationally relate to, interstate commerce. Crossing state lines keyed the 
enumerated power itself; nothing else was required. Chief Justice Mar-
shall referred to this as any commerce touching more states than one. 
Although he referred to commercial intercourse between states, the 
later cases were in no way limited to economic or commercial transac-
tions. Anything crossing state lines was subject to federal power. The 
line of precedent is overwhelming.70 Only the reversed Hammer v. 
Dagenhart 71 case, denying Congress the power to regulate the crossing 
of state lines of things manufactured by children, imposed any limita-
tion on this power. The Court in Lopez also emphasized the commercial 
nature of interstate commerce, but in the context of a law not involving 
the crossing of state lines. 
Few of the lower courts have appreciated the difference between 
these two types of power. 72 One of the exceptions is a problematic Sixth 
67. 29 U.S.C §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Also, the failure to regulate both in-
state and out-of-state production would provide a loophole for employers such as Fred Darby. By 
paying his employees far less than the minimum wage for their intrastate work, he could effec-
tively avoid the economic impact of the law on the work they did for interstate shipment. 
68. 29 U.S.C § 202 (1994). 
69. See, e.g., National Labor Relation~ Board Act (NLRB), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994); 
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-35 (1994). 
70. See supra note 38. 
71. 247 u.s. 251 (1918). 
72. The Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA) cases are illustrative. The CSRA made it 
crime as to anyone who "willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child 
who resides in another state." 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). This seems to me a clear use of Congres-
sional power to regulate things involving more states than one, things clearly within the commerce 
power. Interstate collection of child support is made difficult because of the jurisdictional hurdles. 
Such hurdles are not insurmountable, but the relevance of the state borders are clear. Whether 
Congress was justified in making the federal courts part of the child ~upport enforcement proce-
22 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 14 
Circuit case, United States v. McHenry, 73 which upheld the law making 
carjacking a federal crime. That law74 made it a crime to take by force 
or violence "a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or re-
ceived in interstate or foreign commerce." Since most cars will have 
been shipped interstate at some point in their life, the law is all encom-
passing. Perhaps some car will be manufactured in Michigan, driven by 
a little old librarian from Ann Arbor, Michigan who never leaves the 
comfortable confines of the city, and this fact will be known to the de-
fense attorney, but that is not the likely scenario. It is not clear from the 
law whether it is limited to cars shipped after manufacture to another 
state, or whether having driven it to a neighboring state for a tractor 
race might be sufficient, but even the most restrictive view will include 
most cars. The court in McHenry found that this law involved the 
regulation of instrumentalities75 in interstate commerce and as such, that 
was the end of any inquiry into commerce power. Although it also con-
cluded that Congress could have rationally concluded that carjacking 
substantially affected interstate commerce, it specifically noted that 
such a finding was unnecessary to a holding that the law was within 
commerce power. Even though the McHenry court focused on the in-
strumentalities of commerce as opposed to statutory requirement of the 
crossing of state lines, it at least recognized that no impact on com-
merce needed to be shown. 
Even though this case is used as an example of a modern court rec-
ognizing the regulating of the crossing of state lines as different than 
the regulating of things affecting interstate commerce, it is nonetheless 
dures is a useful political question (discussed in infra Part VI.) but one that does not go to federal 
commerce power. United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027 (I" Cir. 1997), United States v. 
Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222 (5"' Cir. 1997), United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454 (7"' Cir. 1997), 
United States v. Johnson, 114 F. 3d 476 (4"' Cir. 1997) and United States v. Sage, 92 F. 3d 101 (2d 
Cir. 1996) all treated the problem as involving things moving in interstate commerce. (Of this 
group, only Bongiorno and Sage did not also use the rational basis test.) United States v. Mussari, 
95 F.3d 787 (9"' Cir. 1996) emphasized that instrumentalities of interstate commerce were likely 
used for such payments. Reversing the district court, United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 
1997), concluded that Congress could rationally find some substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999 (10"' Cir. 1996) and United States v. Crawford, 
115 F.3d 1397 (8"' Cir. 1997), held that the law fell within both the power to regulate things 
moving in interstate commerce and the "substantially affects" test. Of this group of cases, the 
Bongiorno case is particularly interesting for its use of the word "fribbling." See Bongiorno, 106 
F.3d at 1032. 
73. 97 F.3d 125 (6"' Cir. 1996). 
74. 18 u.s.c. § 2119 (1992). 
75. In this it stated its agreement with the Third and Ninth Circuits' view of automobiles. 
The Third Circuit in United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 588-90 (3'd Cir. 1995), called cars 
"the quintessential instrumentalities of modern interstate commerce" and the Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 550 (9"' Cir. 1995) agreed: "[C]ars are themselves instru-
mentalities of commerce which Congress may protect." 
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discomforting. Unlike more traditional crossing state-line cases, the 
state boundaries appear to be almost irrelevant except as an excuse to 
justify federal power. When the federal government makes it a federal 
crime to ship lottery tickets into a state where it is illegal, it is using its 
power to address a problem that would be difficult to regulate by any 
individual state. When it makes it a crime to transport a kidnap victim 
over interstate lines, it is supplementing the jurisdictional weaknesses of 
the states involved. When it bans the interstate shipment of illegal 
drugs, it helps prevent problems in enforcement in one state from 
tainting the enforcement efforts of another state. It also attacks the 
problem of illegal drugs at a more vulnerable stage than the private use 
behind closed doors. Carjacking a car that at some imprecise time has 
moved in interstate commerce has none of those elements. It comple-
ments state enforcement not a lick. Making it a crime to carjack a car 
and then transport it across state lines would be compatible with tradi-
tional uses of commerce power, but that is not what was done here. 
Unless the instrumentalities of interstate commerce are actually 
crossing state lines, or about to be directly involved in crossing state 
lines, it seems that the "substantially affects" test would be entirely ap-
propriate. If an object, say a car, has both interstate and intrastate uses, 
any regulation of its intrastate uses should be under federal power only 
if there is some substantial connection to interstate commerce. Other-
wise, a member of Congress unhappy with his or her free car wash 
may convince Congress to make it a federal crime to leave watermarks 
on freshly washed cars. After all, "who would be in favor of water 
marks?" As a United States Senator, in adding as a rider a ban on the 
ownership of all machine guns whether connected to interstate com-
merce or not, asked "[w]ho is in favor of owning a machine gun?" 76 
The fact that the question is irrelevant to the concept of limits on enu-
merated power seems to have been missed. 
The fact that the rational basis test has carried the day can hardly be 
doubted. As the Court summarized in the 1981 case of Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Suiface Mining, 77 a case concerning congressional commerce 
power to regulate the effects of surface coal mining, 
The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activ-
ity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a 
finding. This established, the only remaining question for judicial in-
quiry is whether "the means chosen by [Congress is] reasonably 
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." The judicial task is 
76. United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1269 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997). 
77. 452 u.s. 264 (1981). 
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at an end once the Court determines that Congress acted rationally in 
adopting a particular regulatory scheme. 78 
Of course, given the obvious interstate impact of surface coal mining,79 
the same result would have been reached applying the substantially af-
fects test. 
Now the rational basis test is not even limited to its initial applica-
tion in McClung. 80 It has replaced the substantially affects test to a large 
extent. This change occurred shortly after McClung. In Maryland v. 
Wirtz, 81 Congress extended coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
from employees engaged in commerce to employees working for enter-
prises engaged in interstate commerce. This change potentially made it 
easier to require that all business affecting interstate commerce be cov-
ered by the act. It was argued that some employees of interstate enter-
prises were not necessarily individually engaged in commerce. The 
Court said that it was enough that Congress had rationally found them 
to be so. However, Congress had done no such thing. The law still re-
quired that the Court itself apply the substantially affects test, and given 
the aggregate impact of employees of all such interstate enterprises, it 
seemed a pretty easy test to satisfy. However, the Court incorrectly ap-
plied the rational basis test. 
In some of the modern cases paralleling the older substantially af-
fects cases, such as the reach of the National Labor Relations Act in 
Jones & Laughlin or the scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court 
continues to apply the substantially affects test. This may be due to the 
78. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276 (Citations omitted). Although the reasonable basis test is not the 
same as a rational basis test (compare Carolene Products with Weaver v. Palmer Brothers, see 
supra note 39), the Court does not accord any significance to the use of this language in Heart of 
Atlanta Motel. It is common to quote this language, but uncommon to apply any test other than the 
rational basis requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (l1'h Cir. 1997) 
(holding that Congress had the authority to make criminal the possession of all machine guns. 
whether there was any proven movement in interstate commerce or not). The court cites both the 
rational basis and reasonably adapted language from Hodel via Lopez but thereafter applied simply 
the rational basis test. !d. at 1270. United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454 (7"' Cir. 1997) (upholding 
the Child Support Recovery Act which makes it a federal crime for an out-of-state parent not to 
pay child support) does exactly the same thing. /d. at 459. 
79. On the simplest level, interstate coal companies subject to strict environmental regula-
tions could not compete with intrastate companies exempted from such regulations. 
80. This statement is as clear as anything from Justice Rehnquist's separate concurring 
opinion in Hodel. Although calling the concept of Congress' being of limited powers a fiction, he 
concludes, "Thus it would be a mistake to conclude that Congress' power to regulate pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause is unlimited. Some activities may be so private or local in nature that they 
simply may not be in commerce." He emphasized the "substantially affects" test as being the ma-
jor test, but then admitted somewhat begrudgingly that even when Congress is the one applying 
that test, "Congress' findings must be supported by a 'rational basis' and are reviewable by the 
courts." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 311. 
81. 392 u.s. 183 (1968). 
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language in some of the older acts limiting their application to things 
"affecting interstate commerce" but it may also be out of respect for the 
older precedents. 82 The older statutes used the "affecting" language in 
an attempt to avoid the wholesale finding of unconstitutionality. Con-
gress was uncertain of the scope of its power to regulate interstate 
commerce, so it allowed the Court to decide on a case by case basis the 
constitutional issues related to whether commerce was impacted. The 
statutory requirement mimicked what was thought to be the constitu-
tional requirement. 
V. A CLOSER LOOK AT LOPEZ 
Not until 1995, in United States v. Lopez,83 did the Court margin-
ally retreat from the rational basis test that seemed to have carried the 
day. In Lopez, the issue was possession of a gun on public school 
grounds, a strictly local activity. The Court was asked, without any 
evidence, to accept that this law implicated some interstate commerce 
concern. The Court rejected the argument and noted that no commercial 
interest of any type seemed to be involved. The Court's apparent point 
was not that the commerce clause had to involve commercial endeav-
ors, but only that it was less likely to make a leap of faith to find a sub-
stantial effect on commerce when no commercial concerns were impli-
cated.84 
However, even in Lopez, the Court does not actually reject the ra-
tional basis test. The Lopez opinion is schizophrenic, mostly because it 
is a "substantial affect" case, but reflects a rational basis analysis. After 
surveying the key historical decisions, the Court summarizes Jones & 
Laughlin, Darby, and Wickard as requiring that the regulated activities 
substantially affect interstate commerce. Lopez then concludes, "Since 
that time, the Court has heeded that warning and undertaken to decide 
whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity 
sufficiently affected interstate commerce. "85 The Lopez Court then cited 
a number of "e.g." cases, including Perez, McClung, and Heart of At-
82. See supra note 9. 
83. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
84. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997): "Lopez sends a clear 
cautionary signal that federal criminalization of intrastate noneconomic activity, when such regula-
tion is not essential to a broader regulation of commercial activity, will have difficulty satisfying 
the substantial effects basis for Commerce Clause regulation." /d. at 1009. Of course, it is not 
often difficult for the reviewing court to find some commercial activity. See, e.g., United States v. 
Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding within the commerce power the Freedom of Access 
to Clinic Entrances Act, which has no interstate component, because performing abortions is a 
commercial activity). 
85. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. 
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lanta Motel. 86 Perez is the most interesting citation of the group, since 
the majority opinion in Perez does not refer to the rational basis test at 
all. Other than referring to the aggregate impact approach, the Perez 
Court does not indicate what test it is applying. In fact, Justice Stewart 
dissents, claiming that even a modest level of review was not employed 
by the majority. 87 Later in the Lopez case, both Perez and McClung are 
listed as examples of where the Court has "concluded that the activity 
substantially affected interstate commerce. "88 Of course, neither Perez 
nor McClung did any such thing. Is it any wonder that the Lopez court 
must lament that "our case law has not been clear whether an activity 
must 'affect' or 'substantially affect' interstate commerce"?89 Finally, 
however, the Court concludes strongly that the weight of authority re-
quires that "the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate com-
merce" in order to be within Congress' power to regulate it under the 
Commerce Clause. 90 
Justice Breyer's dissent in Lopez, joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Ginsburg, also makes it clear that the majority was not ap-
plying the rational basis test. 91 He considers the "substantial affect" re-
quirement as inconsistent and views the precedents as requiring a "sig-
86. A fourth case was cited, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 
452 u.s. 264, 276-80 (1981). 
87. Compare this objection with the due process case of Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 
(1963) where the majority opinion does not once mention the rational basis test in upholding state 
economic legislation involving debt collection against a due process challenge. It is left to Justice 
Harlan's two line concurring opinion to mention the supposedly operative test. /d. at 733. 
88. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
89. !d. 
90. /d. 
91. Separate concurring opinions by Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy, in which Justice 
O'Connor joined, go their divergent ways. Justice Kennedy, in a thoughtful essay on the impor-
tance of the concept of a Congress with limited powers in our federalist system, argues for mean-
ingful Court involvement in protecting the key attributes of our federalist system: 
Of the various structural elements in the Constitution, separation of powers, checks and 
balances, judicial review, and federalism, only concerning the last does there seem to 
be much uncertainty respecting the existence, and the content, of standards that allow 
the Judiciary to play a significant role in maintaining the design contemplated by the 
Framers. 
/d. at 575. But Justice Kennedy does not commit to any particular approach in resolving the deli-
cate balance between state and federal power. Justice Thomas is of the opinion that the "substan-
tially affects" test needs to be re-evaluated. Unlike this Article, which decries the abandonment of 
that test in favor of the standardless, valueless rational basis test, Justice Thomas argues that the 
substantially affects test was an unwarranted expansion of pre-New Deal commerce clause juris-
prudence. Somewhat amazingly, he even defends the E. C. Knight rejection of manufacturing as 
being within federal commerce power and concludes: "I am aware of no cases prior to the New 
Deal that characterized the power flowing from the commerce clause as sweepingly as does our 
substantial affects test. My review of the case law indicates that the substantial affects test is but an 
innovation of the 20th century." /d. at 596. 
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nificant affect," which to him is less than "substantial. "92 However, the 
key to his approach is not the difference between significant and sub-
stantial, but rather that "the Constitution requires us to judge the con-
nection between a regulated activity and interstate commerce, not di-
rectly, but at one removed. "93 The Breyer dissent insists that the Court 
must defer to Congress in determining that there is a significant factual 
connection "because the determination requires an empirical judgement 
of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with ac-
curacy. The traditional words 'rational basis' capture this leeway. "94 
Breyer then concludes, "[t]hus, the specific question before us, as the 
Court recognizes, is not whether the 'regulated activity sufficiently af-
fected interstate commerce,' but, rather whether Congress could have 
had 'a rational basis' for so concluding. "95 
This is exactly the question that Breyer asks about the Lopez case: 
"Could Congress rationally have found that 'violent crime in school 
zones,' through its effect on the 'quality of education,' significantly (or 
substantially)96 affects 'interstate' or 'foreign commerce'?"97 He con-
cludes "yes" with an interesting qualification: "As long as one views 
the commerce connection, not as a 'technical legal conception,' but as 
'a practical one, "'98 citing the opinion of Justice Holmes in Swift & Co. 
v. United States. 99 The quote from Holmes is interesting because the 
Swift case is the ultimate in technical distinctions. Earlier cases such as 
E. C. Knight had found that the kind of manufacturing and processing 
found in the Swift stockyards were not commerce within federal power. 
Instead of directly reversing these undoubtedly erroneous decisions, 
Holmes said that a stockyard business was such a continuous operation 
that it was all part of the current of commerce. In other words, Holmes 
tried to fit the regulation within the crossing of state lines form of 
commerce power as opposed to what it was, local activities affecting 
interstate commerce. This current of commerce approach was largely 
abandoned in Jones & Laughlin, where the Court said it was unneces-
92. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616 (Breyer. J., dissenting). 
93. /d. 
94. /d. at 616-17. 
95. /d. at617. 
96. Since any difference between significant and substantial seems shading at best, it's hard 
to understand Justice Breyer's insistence on trying to substitute significant as a synonymous term 
for the historically accepted substantial. What's key is that under the rational basis test Congress, 
not the Court, makes the applicable finding, with the Court only nodding in consent, "Sounds ra-
tional to us." Nonetheless, Breyer in Lopez consistently refers to the significant impact with sub-
stantial in parentheses as though a definition were needed. 
97. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618 (Breyer. J., dissenting). 
98. /d. 
99. 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905). 
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sary to consider the current or stream of commerce cases since the test 
was whether the local activity had a practical impact on interstate com-
merce.100 
The quote of Justice Breyer is interesting in another way as well. 
His approach in Lopez makes it quite clear that he is not interested in 
the practical impact emphasized in Jones & Laughlin, but rather is 
willing to accept Congress' technical conclusion as to the impact on 
commerce as conclusive. In Jones & Laughlin, the Court stated "[w]e 
have often said that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. 
It is equally true that interferences with that commerce must be ap-
praised by a judgment that does not ignore actual experience. " 101 Fur-
ther, the Court in Jones & Laughlin made a careful finding of the actual 
impact on interstate commerce of labor unrest in a highly integrated 
interstate steel operation, something which Justice Breyer found unnec-
essary. 
The significance of Breyer's conclusion that the rational basis test 
meant that the courts were one step removed cannot be emphasized 
enough. The rational basis due process, and equal protection cases 
where this difference is key are legion. One of the most famous is Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical, 102 where the Court concluded that the laws 
regulating optometry passed by the Oklahoma legislature might be 
"needless, [and] wasteful," but that they were nonetheless rational. 103 In 
Board of Railroad Retirement v. Fritz, 104 the Court is at pains to figure 
out why persons with more years of service in the railroad lose their 
pensions but persons with fewer years and holding a current union 
membership keep theirs. Though knowing full well that the probable 
explanation was that the union wrote the law for Congress to favor their 
current members, the Court concluded that it was conceivable that 
Congress saw some rational connection to some conceivable state end. 
Even in a case as recent as Nordlinger v. Hahn, 105 where the Court up-
held California Proposition 13, (which discriminated as to property 
taxes based upon time of purchase), the Court had trouble seeing any 
justification for a lack of equality as to something as basic as real prop-
erty taxes. Nonetheless, the Court found that surely California could 
conclude that this law was rationally connected to some overly broad 
attempt at protecting persons on fixed income from being taxed out of 
100. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36-37. 
101. /d. at 41-42. 
102. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
103. !d. at 487. 
104. 449 U.S. 166 (1980). 
105. 505. U.S. I (1992). 
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their property. And Breyer's dissent in Lopez is a perfect example of 
the significance of this approach in interpreting commerce power: Con-
gress, by saying it, makes it so. 106 
Brzonkala, both at the district court level and the en bane decision 
of the Fourth Circuit, is a careful and thoughtful analysis of the Lopez 
opinion. The circuit court's majority opinion applies principally the 
"substantially affects" test and only at the end of its commerce clause 
analysis does it mention the rational basis test at all. It calls the claims 
for the rational basis test, "a deference so absolute as to preclude any 
independent judicial evaluation of constitutionality whatsoever, a defer-
ence indistinguishable from judicial abdication. " 107 Although rejecting 
the deferential level of review claimed for the rational basis test, the 
Fourth Circuit acknowledges that the rational basis level of review may 
be the correct one. It nonetheless claims that in applying the "substan-
tially affects" test, that it is faithfully applying the rational basis test. 
The approach of the majority is far removed from the classic formula-
tions of the rational basis test found in Carotene and McClung, but it is 
a faithful application of the "substantially affects" test. 
One of the interesting differences between Lopez and Brzonkala is 
the congressional finding of impact on interstate commerce in the 
VA W A. The act specifically states that Congress' concern is for acts of 
violence which substantially affect interstate commerce. It does not re-
quire that the court find any effect on interstate commerce in a particu-
lar case, but, unlike Lopez, it at least acknowledges the relevancy of the 
commerce power. When Congress says that certain things will affect 
interstate commerce, the courts typically call that a finding of jurisdic-
tional facts. The VA W A does not go so far as to say that violence 
against women will presumptively affect interstate commerce, as Con-
gress said of racial discrimination in McClung. That failure may or may 
not be significant. It is possible that all Lopez means is that Congress 
must first make such an assertion before the court, under the guise of 
rational basis, will uncritically accept the congressional assertion. Since 
the VA W A also did not make any such presumptive findings, the 
Brzonkala majority did not view itself bound to accept any presumption 
of harm to interstate commerce. In Lopez, there was no claim in the 
legislation itself that guns on school property had anything to do with 
commerce at all, so at least the VA WA goes further in attempting to 
106. The dissent in Brzonkala essentially follows this approach. The Brzonkala majority 
claims, "[T]he dissent, after announcing the 'rational basis' standard of review, offers not a single 
sentence-not one-of independent analysis of whether gender-motivated violence substantially af-
fects interstate commerce." 169 F. 3d at 857. 
107. !d. 
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draw some commerce clause connections. Lopez does not address 
whether the Court would uncritically accept Congress' claim that guns 
on school property will affect commerce. And Congress was not willing 
to take the risk that the Court would not critically accept such a claim. 
Although initially Congress passed a new version of the Guns on 
Schools law which said that guns did impact interstate commerce, it 
eventually changed the law to require that the gun or the carrier had to 
cross interstate lines. 108 
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Is it likely that the Supreme Court will reject the rational basis test, 
roll back its Commerce Clause theories to pre-1964 and reinstate the 
"substantially affects" test of 1937?109 Probably not, but Brzonkala 
would give the Court the perfect opportunity to do so. 110 The "substan-
tially affects" test gives Congress ample ability to regulate any local 
activity actually impacting interstate commerce to any significant de-
gree. Congress, apparently, is not the least bit concerned with interstate 
commerce. It wishes to pass legislation and views the concept of enu-
merated powers as a minor speed bump in its rush to federalize every-
thing. Before Lopez-and in all likelihood after it as well-the rational 
basis test gave Congress the means by which it could do just that. All 
Congress had to do was say that commerce was impacted and the ra-
tional basis test took care of the rest. Eventually, Congress became so 
sure of its legislative powers that it even stopped taking the preliminary 
step of making certain holdings and just assumed that the Court would 
fill in the details. The Court filled in the details until Lopez. 
This Article accepts as an element of faith that protecting federal-
ism by limiting Congress to enumerated powers is a constitutional prin-
108. See the reference to this change in the following quote from the majority opinion in the 
Brzonkala case: 
[Congress], at the Administration's urging, amended 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) by adding a 
jurisdictional element. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (limiting statute's reach to 
prohibition of possession, in a school zone, of a firearm "that has moved in or that oth-
erwise affects interstate or foreign commerce"), with 31 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 809 
(May 15, 1995) (presenting Attorney General Reno's "analysis of Lopez" and recom-
mended "legislative solution" of limiting the statute's reach by adding a jurisdictional 
element, "thereby bring[ing] it within the Congress' Commerce Clause authority"). 
169 F.3d at 849. 
109. The idea seems not as far-fetched to me as Justice Thomas' expressed desire in Lopez to 
reject even the substantial affects test in favor of something pre-20th Century. See supra note 91. 
110. And if certiorari is either not sought or not granted in Brzonkala, the Lopez issue is so 
heavily litigated that the Court has a plethora of opportunities to expand on Lopez. The Court 
recently granted certiorari in Jones v. United States, 1999 WL 699893, 1999 U.S. Lexis 7495 
(U.S.), to determine if the federal arson law applied to the burning of private residences and, if so, 
whether that would be consistent with Lopez. 
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ciple worth arguing about, but there is a legitimate question as to 
whether this bedrock principle is worth the trouble. The Court in Lopez 
struck down the first federal law in sixty years on such grounds, despite 
the century being replete with examples of federal laws having little 
connection to enumerated powers. 111 And the flurry of litigation after 
Lopez indicates that most such challenges are fruitless and only serve to 
clog up the judicial system. The Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), 
passed just four years ago, has already generated nine circuit court 
opinions and even more district court opinions. 112 The strain on judicial 
resources on just one CRSA case can be tremendous. As the First Cir-
cuit in United States v. Bongiomo113 observed before upholding the act: 
"In many respects the history of this litigation resembles a Greek Trag-
edy, excerpts of which from time to time have occupied the attention of 
no fewer than ten federal and state judges across the nation." 
It is often claimed that this constitutionally mandated division of 
authority "was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fun-
damental liberties. " 114 The Lopez court agrees that a balance of power 
between the federal government and the states "will reduce the risk of 
tyranny and abuse from either front." 115 While I personally believe that 
our federalist system is a healthy one, this particular reason seems weak 
at best. First, fundamental individual rights are amply protected from 
federal laws by a combination of the checks and balances within the 
federal government, especially independent judicial review, and the Bill 
of Rights. Second, if only Congress could pass laws, it would be easier 
to spot attempted invasions of our civil rights. However, we are so dis-
tracted by the various pieces of legislation and regulations being en-
acted every day at many different legislative and administrative levels, 
it is only when the law impacts us directly that we are likely to notice. 
Finally, even if notions of federalism were in some way protective 
of our civil rights, that would not mean that a restrictive view of com-
merce would necessarily advance that goal. A decision striking down a 
federal law based upon a narrow view of the commerce power might be 
overcome by the exercise of some other enumerated power, such as the 
spending power or the taxing power. 116 On the other hand, spending 
Ill. To be fair, there are other cases where the Court has limited the application of federal 
law to avoid the constitutional issue. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991), for example, 
limited the potential reach of the federal Age Discrimination Act to avoid conflict with fundamen-
tal principles of federalism. 
112. See supra note 72. 
113. 106 F.3d 1027, 1029 (1" Cir. 1997). 
114. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
115. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458). 
116. The only case to disapprove of such an end run, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The 
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and taxing are not perfect parallels to legislation under the Commerce 
Clause. For example, Congress could use its spending power to en-
courage states to more effectively address domestic violence by doing 
away with the spousal privilege in rape, but it could not use the spend-
ing power to make domestic violence a federal crime. However, if the 
appropriate impact on interstate commerce were found, Congress could 
use its commerce power to make spousal rape a crime. 117 As for the 
spending power, it is always possible that a particular state would 
rather forego federal funds than to accede to federal demands. 
Another approach might be to let Congress pass any law it wanted 
and switch the argument to the political arena: Do the states or the peo-
ple want Congress federalizing everything? Despite my doubt that the 
political processes will place much in the way of significant limits on 
congressional power, there is a certain appeal to that approach at the 
legislative level. As an example, what exactly does the federal carjack-
ing law accomplish? Several federal courts have wrestled with whether 
it is within the realm of federal commerce power and concluded that it 
was. 118 I think the better question would be whether this issue was being 
adequately handled at the state and local level. Or better still, was there 
some pocket of local government in this country that had fallen under 
some perverted Amish anti-car influence and thus local car owners 
needed the federal government to step in and protect their unhindered 
access to drive unmolested to Orlando, Florida? It's bad enough that the 
federal courts have to spend their time resolving the legal issue of enu-
merated power. It's even worse that the federal trial courts are put to 
the burden of trying what are in essence local cases of malicious rob-
bery. 119 Is this the best use of the best and the brightest of our life-
appointed federal judges, or are there local and state judges out there, 
not aspiring to the leisure of the federal court calendar, who are quite 
competent to handle such matters? 
Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922), striking down a punitive federal tax on goods pro-
duced by child labor as being an improper regulation of intrastate manufacturing, has long since 
been rejected. See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (upholding a confisca-
tory tax on the interstate shipment of sawed off shotguns). 
117. If nothing else, Congress could use its power over the crossing of state lines to fashion 
a federal criminal law. See supra note 14 (discussing the criminal provisions of the VAWA). Even 
if the Court were to accept the claim in this Article, that the rational basis test should be aban-
doned, the result might only be the increased arbitrary use of pointless references to interstate 
travel as triggering the federal law. 
118. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995), with one judge dis-
senting. 
119. Most of the federal carjacking cases are straightforward, small-time criminal law cases. 
See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1134 (3d Cir. 1997) (circuit court decision where the 
major issue was whether a 12-year old passenger was a vulnerable victim for purposes of the fed-
eral carjacking law). 
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Rather than debating the intricacies of the commerce clause, a 
straightforward policy judgment as to whether any subject is worth fed-
eralizing might be the better approach. But judges do not have the 
choice of debating the true issue. They are limited to defining the vaga-
ries of the commerce clause and in so doing hopefully advance the 
overall principles of federalism, but any overlap between the real issues 
and the legal niceties may be more limited than we care to admit. A fair 
question would be whether the rational basis test or the substantially af-
fects test is more likely to overlap with fundamental federalist concerns. 
The dissenting opinion in Brzonkala argues that the rational basis test 
correctly gives Congress the principle role. 120 I believe that the Consti-
tution and, until the McClung case, Supreme Court precedents gave the 
Court that primary function. I am not in favor of the rational basis test 
in any of its forms. If the due process and equal protection clauses were 
intended to protect individual liberties then they should protect interests 
that people care about-work, health, housing-as well as more high pro-
file concerns like speech and privacy. I do not believe that the rational 
basis test allows the Court to play any significant role in protecting such 
bread and butter rights. Nonetheless, the historical approach of extreme 
judicial deference is well established in the due process and equal pro-
tection field. 121 With the recent Lopez case, there is still time to recon-
sider the appropriate judicial rule in determining the breadth and scope 
of Congress' power to regulate everything under the patently fictional 
claim of concern for interstate commerce. The rational basis test is no 
test at all, and its level of judicial deference is so extreme as to alter 
dramatically the precarious balance of power between the states and the 
federal government. The "substantially affects" test comes closer to 
confining Congress properly to those subjects needing the inflexibility 
of the monolith of a federal approach. 
120. 169 F.3d at 918 (Motz, J., dissenting). 
121. There are some recent notable exceptions to this extreme level of deference in the due 
process and equal protection cases, but it is hard to see whether these cases represent a trend or an 
aberration. See, e.g., ); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding unconstitutional Colo-
rado's exclusion of gays from groups given protection against arbitrary discrimination); City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding invalid a city law that placed ad-
ditional burdens on group homes for the mentally retarded not imposed on other types of group 
homes); Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (striking down an Alabama law 
which with Congressional approval taxed out of state insurance companies more than in state com-
panies); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a Texas law denying public education 
to children of illegal aliens). Adding these cases to Lopez and Boerne, the inconceivable is possi-
ble-that the rational basis test itself may become a significant level of review. Somehow I doubt it. 
I also doubt that Hohfeldian principles much influenced the writing of the U.S. Constitution. See 
contra H. Newcomb Morse, Applying the Hohfield System to Constitutional Analysis, 9 WHITTIER 
L. REv. 639 (1988). 
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Perhaps the courts might, as a minimum, require that Congress say 
that something will impact interstate commerce. One would think that 
McClung required some such jurisdictional statement and the Court was 
to apply the rational basis test only to those situations where Congress 
made a presumptive finding that certain things impacted interstate 
commerce. Such a statement would be an improvement, in that such 
specific language would require that Congress acknowledge openly that 
it is choosing to maximize its power vis-a-vis the states and was willing 
to bear whatever political cost such an open admission would bring. 
Congress is required to do something similar when it abrogates the 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the states. 122 But McClung 
has never been strictly limited to just such situations. 
Finally, I suggest a modest proposal, that every federal law passed, 
whatever the source of enumerated power, should be required to have a 
"Federalism Impact Statement," where Congress specifically addresses 
the impact the law will have on the independent sovereignty of the 
states. Congress would also identify the increased burden on our central 
government in accepting the primary responsibility for the resolution of 
every problem. Such a statement might also address the trivialization of 
our vaunted federal judiciary. 123 It's not that these issues are not im-
portant, but they do not necessarily need the collective wisdom of life 
appointed judges to resolve. 124 No right thinking person can believe that 
guns should be allowed on public school properties, but is there a need 
to federalize such a concern? This is not a matter of good laws or bad 
laws. There are subtle and not so subtle costs to our system when Con-
gress tries to do too much and has too little confidence in the diversity 
of our federalist system. I believe that there would be some difficult-to-
122. In FitljJatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), the Court found that Congress could ab-
rogate sovereign immunity of the states using its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but only if there was a plain statement that it intended to do so. Before it was over-
ruled on other grounds, the Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), had the same 
requirement as to abrogation of immunity using commerce power. 
123. Compare with the following sentiment of a wise old teacher of Jurisprudence: 
The more you depart from simplicity the more you dilute the truth. Passing from the 
purgatorial process to the desired destiny of simplicity, Thoreau wrote: 'Our life is 
frittered away by detail. An honest man has hardly need to count more than his ten fin-
gers, or in extreme cases he may add his ten toes, and lump the rest. Simplicity, sim-
plicity, simplicity! I say, let your affairs be as two or three, and not a hundred or a 
thousand; instead of a million count half a dozen, and keep your accounts on your 
thumb-nail.' 
H. Newcomb Morse, The Johnsonian Definitional Delimitation of Constitutional Speech, 17 
WHITTIER L. REV. 403, 404 (1996), quoting HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN OR LIFE IN 
THE WOODS 66 (New American Library 1960) (1854). 
124. See supra note 119 and its description of the efforts of the Third Circuit in working 
through the intricacies of the federal carjacking law. 
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quantify harm to our form of government were Congress, for example, 
to mandate school uniforms in all our public schools. It's not that such 
a law would be bad, but surely federal energy focused on such inher-
ently local matters diverts our federal government from addressing 
those problems that the individual states are incompetent to handle. 
That, I believe, was what the Framers intended for the central govern-
ment. 125 Whatever temptations Congress may face to federalize every 
problem imaginable, the Constitution and history cautions otherwise. 
125. And not so coincidentally, that is exactly what the Framers of the United States Con-
stitution initially approved before sending their proposal for limiting the scope of federal power to 
the Committee of Details. For reasons unknown, the Committee of Details came back with specific 
enumerations of various powers, and that is the language ultimately approved by the Framers. 
WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D.VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS at 
152-54 (lOth ed. 1998) (quoting from the historical record). 
